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SUBJECT: BIC-IV: (U) U.S. AND RUSSIAN BRIEFINGS ON STATUS
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOSCOW TREATY, OCTOBER 26, 2005

Classified By: DAS Karin L. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC).
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d).

1. (U) This is BIC-IV-002.

2. (U) Meeting Date: October 26, 2005
Time: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (C) The U.S. and Russian Delegations each provided briefings on the status of implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the "Moscow Treaty" (MT)) as of October 2005. The Russian Delegation said, as of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of Russian warheads accountable under the Treaty would be 2,913. The U.S. Delegation said as of September 30, 2005, aggregate number of U.S. operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODNSW) was 4,073. The Parties also asked questions to clarify the briefings that were presented.

4. (C) The Russian Delegation's responses to U.S. questions indicated that Russia continues to count the reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs in launchers, as well as heavy bomber weapons on bombers and in storage areas on bomber bases as MT strategic nuclear warheads. They confirmed that none of Russia's heavy bomber weapons are included in the aggregate number of 2,913 strategic nuclear warheads.

5. (C) The Russian Delegation again asked for an explanation of why the United States used quotation marks around the term "nuclear" in the U.S. definition and why the United States referred to "nuclear" reentry vehicles and nuclear armaments in its briefing? Should nuclear be used inside quotation marks, carried over from the MT Letters of Transmittal, in both places? The U.S. Delegation explained that the quotation marks carried over from the MT Letters of Transmittal and were only meant to highlight that this Treaty applied to only nuclear warheads. When the Treaty was submitted to the U.S. Congress, the Executive Branch wanted to make this point clear.

INTRODUCTION

6. (C) Ul'yanov stated that progress had been made during the previous BIC meeting on the definition for strategic nuclear warheads and he hoped to resolve the issue by the spring 2006 BIC meeting. He expected the BIC to provide an opportunity for transparency discussions and to move closer to the effective implementation of the MT.

7. (U) DAS Look began by noting her pleasure at seeing so many familiar faces on the Russian side, and added that Dr. Look was sorry he was unable to head this BIC meeting in order to say good-bye and to help in the transition for the new JCIC representative. She commented that she had been working issues related to the control and reduction of missiles for 20 years and said that the relationship between the United States and Russia had changed significantly in that time, and that the change had been for the good. The way the Parties talk about issues and the tools at our disposal have also changed. The MT is emblematic of the new relationship and offers a different way to work as partners. She also noted that the BIC had been a useful form for discussion. Ul'yanov said that he was sorry to see Dr. Look leave the BIC, as he had established a positive relationship with him. He agreed with DAS Look's assessment of the MT, but did not think that the BIC itself was a good benchmark. It needs to be more substantive.

U.S. BRIEFING

18. (U) After opening comments, the U.S. and Russian Delegations each provided briefings on the status of implementation of MT, as of October 2005.

19. (U) Paragraph 11 contains the slides and notes from the U.S. presentation on Strategic Nuclear Forces delivered at the Russian Mission on October 26, 2005. Hard copies of the briefing slides, without the narratives, were provided to the Russian Delegation. Paragraph 13 contains the official translation of the Russian briefing.

110. (U) Mullins presented the U.S. briefing and clarifying text, which included the updated U.S. ODSNW number of 4,037, as of September 30, 2005.

111. (U) Begin text (U.S. Briefing):

Slide One

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces
Bilateral Implementation Commission
October 2005

Narrative for Slide One:

- This will be a short briefing that will provide you an update on our plans for strategic nuclear forces.
- You will notice that this briefing has not changed much since the last session.
- This briefing will summarize actions we have taken and long-range plans for these forces.

Slide Two

U.S. Plans for Strategic Nuclear Forces

- Reduce total operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012:
 - Remove some delivery systems from service; and
 - For delivery systems retained, remove some warheads from operational missiles to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.
- Completed actions:
 - Removed 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service.
 - B-1B conventional role only.
 - Deactivated 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs
- Ongoing actions:
 - Removing some warheads from operational missiles.
 - Modifying 4 Trident I SSBNs to carry Trident II SLBMs.
 - Deactivating Trident I SLBMs.
- Baseline 2012 Strategic Nuclear Force Structure:
 - 14 Trident II SSBNs
 - 21 B-2 Bombers
 - 500 Minuteman III ICBMs
 - 76 B-52H Bombers

Narrative for Slide Two:

- Our existing strategic nuclear force structure, with the reductions mentioned during previous briefings, will remain in service at least through 2020.
 - Minuteman service life is projected through 2020.
 - Ohio class ballistic missile submarines have been extended in life and the oldest of the remaining 14 is planned to be operational beyond 2025.
 - Our oldest bomber, the B-52, has had numerous upgrades and, along with the B-2, should remain operational for several decades.
- We have underway, or in the planning stages, life extension programs to ensure that these systems remain reliable and safe and incorporate modern electronics.

- In addition, we are just beginning to examine options to replace these weapon systems when each reaches the end of its service life.

Slide Three

October 2005 Update on ICBMs

ICBMs -- Deactivate all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs

- Status: As of 19 September 2005: 50 Peacekeeper missiles removed from strategic service.

-- All 50 missiles deactivated.

-- Silos will remain START accountable and inspectable.

Narrative for Slide Three:

Intercontinental ballistic missiles:

- Our entire force of Peacekeeper missiles has been deactivated.

-- The first missile was deactivated in October 2002.

-- On 19 September 2005, we completed deactivation on all 50 missiles.

-- Peacekeeper silos will remain START accountable and inspectable.

Slide Four

October 2005 Update on SSBNs

Modification of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs

- Status: Four Trident I SSBNs have been removed from strategic service and have begun refueling overhauls and modification to SSGNs.

- All launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable

- There are no plans to return Trident I SSBNs to strategic service

Modification of 4 Trident I SSBNs to Trident II

- Status: Two submarines have been converted from Trident I to Trident II; a third has begun conversion and the fourth will begin conversion in early 2006.

- Trident I SLBMs are being deactivated.

Narrative for Slide Four:

Ballistic missile submarines

- Our plan to remove 4 Trident I ballistic missile submarines from strategic service and to modify them for other roles is on track.

-- All four of the submarines have already been withdrawn from strategic service. The ballistic missiles have been removed from all 4 of the submarines.

- We plan for Initial Operational Capability of the four SSGNs to begin in 2007.

- Launchers will remain START accountable and inspectable.

- Our plan for the other four Trident I submarines is to modify them to carry the Trident II SLBM.

-- Two of these modifications are complete; a third has begun modification and the fourth and final modification will begin in early 06.

Slide Five

October 2005 Update on Heavy Bombers

Heavy Bombers - No Change

Narrative for Slide Five:

Heavy Bombers

- There are no changes in our heavy bomber force since the last meeting of the BIC.

Slide Six

Total U.S. Operationally Deployed
Strategic Nuclear Warheads

- For purposes of the Moscow Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be:

- reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles in their launchers,
- reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and

- nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases.

-- In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber bases. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

-- In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only "nuclear" reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

- As of September 30, 2005, the aggregate number of U.S. Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads was 4037.

Narrative for Slide Six:

- As we have stated previously, this is the U.S. definition of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

- The aggregate number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads as of September 30, 2005, was 4037.

In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear weapons (including spare ICBM warheads and bomber weapons) are located in the weapon storage area at a heavy bomber base. The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only "nuclear" reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles in their launchers, as well as nuclear-armed cruise missiles or bombs at heavy bomber bases or loaded on bombers, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

Slide Seven

Summary

- U.S. strategic nuclear force reductions remain consistent with previous briefings.

- Current and planned strategic nuclear force structure and activities are consistent with the new strategic environment.

Narrative for Slide Seven:

- In summary, our strategic nuclear force plans remain unchanged from the plans we presented to Defense Minister Ivanov in 2002.

- Our actions to date have been consistent with those plans.

- As you have seen, we have a number of activities in progress related to sustainment of these forces and implementation of our defense strategy.

- These activities, and our strategic nuclear forces, are consistent with the new strategic environment.

- Our intention is to continue to provide transparency and predictability on our activities and forces through actions such as this briefing.

End text.

RUSSIAN BRIEFING

12. (C) Fedorchenko delivered the Russian briefing by reading most of the text and clarifying that the number of Russian strategic nuclear warheads, as of November 1, 2005, was 2,913. In addition, on slide Four, he remarked that Russia had not yet decided whether to put the road-mobile SS-27 into service. On slide Five, he added that Russia is replacing existing SS-N-23 SLBMs with new ones.

13. (U) Begin text (Russian Briefing):

BIC

Official Translation

Title Page: Status of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces and Results of their Reduction in 2005. Briefing in the Bilateral Implementation Commission for the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, October 2005

Page 2

Total Number of Strategic Nuclear Warheads

-- Within the framework of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, for purposes of counting nuclear warheads the Russian Federation considers the following:

- nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs;
- nuclear warheads on deployed SLBMs;
- nuclear warheads on deployed heavy bombers and those located in storage depots of airbases (airfields) where heavy bombers are based.

As of November 1, 2005, the aggregate number of warheads of the Russian Federation that are accountable under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions will be 2913.

Page 3

Russian Federation's Plans to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces

OBJECTIVE: By the end of 2012, reduce the total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200.

AREAS OF IMPLEMENTATION:

- removal from service of missile complexes, submarines, and heavy bombers that have reached the end of their warranted service life;
 - elimination of strategic offensive arms that have been removed from service;
 - conversion of ICBM silo launchers, SSBN launchers, and heavy bombers into new reduced-armament strategic offensive weapons;
 - developing and putting into service the newest land-based and sea-based strategic missile complexes.
- Russia's plans to reduce its strategic nuclear forces have not changed since the previous session of BIC.

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Future Development of the SRF

1. MC (Missile Complex) with SS-18 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at end of service life; elimination of missiles and silo launchers.
2. MC with SS-19 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at end of service life; elimination of missiles and conversion of silo launchers.
3. MC with SS-25 ICBMs - Scheduled removal from service at end of service life; elimination of missiles and road-mobile launchers.
4. MC with SS-24 ICBMs - Completion of elimination of missiles and rail-mobile launchers.
5. MC with SS-27 ICBMs for silo launcher - Scheduled introduction into service, using converted ICBM SS-19 silo launchers.
6. MC with SS-27 ICBMs for road-mobile launcher - Continued flight and design testing.

Prior to 2013 the Russian Federation does not plan to build new silo launchers or to develop new rail-mobile launchers.

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Future Development of the Strategic Forces of the Russian Navy

1. Delta III-Class Submarines with SS-N-18 SLBMs - Scheduled removal from service at end of service life, elimination of missiles, launchers, and submarines.
2. Delta IV-Class Submarines with SS-N-23 SLBMs - Modernization of the weapons system.
3. Typhoon-Class Submarines with SS-N-20 SLBMs - Removal from service and elimination of missiles and submarine launchers.

14. New-Generation Submarines - Development, testing, and preparations for putting into service.

15. Development of new SLBM (RSM-56). Continuation of flight-design testing of the missile.

Page 6

Future Development of Russia's Strategic Aircraft

1. Bear Heavy Bomber - Removal from service of heavy bombers that have reached the end of their service life. Modernization of weapons systems.

2. Blackjack Heavy Bomber - Modernization of weapons systems.

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Conclusion

The Russian Federation is implementing its plans to reduce its strategic nuclear forces with an aim to fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The Russian Federation is independently determining the structure of its SNF guided by national security interests and the maintenance of strategic stability.

End text.

14. (C) Look observed that both briefings reflected that both the United States and Russia were on glide paths to lower ODSNW numbers. Both sides were willing to discuss the actual status of their forces and, while there was always room for improvement, the sides need to remember that the dialogue had come a long way toward openness. Ul'yanov replied that he shared Look's assessment, but that there is always room for perfection and additional transparency. Look responded that perfection is in the eye of the beholder.

RUSSIAN QUESTIONS

15. (C) Ul'yanov stated that he appreciated the inclusion in the briefing of the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW and hoped that the number would continue to be exchanged at least twice each year. He suggested that the sides ask questions today and the answers be provided on Thursday. He asked why the U.S. ODSNW definition continued to use the word nuclear in quotation marks. Look replied that she had noted that this question had been asked at the previous BIC meeting and had asked her delegation for an answer. She continued that, in her view and that of her delegation, the quotation marks had been added for emphasis to reflect the difference from how START accounted for reentry vehicles when the Treaty had been forwarded to the U.S. Congress.

16. (C) Artyukhin asked about the difference between "nuclear" reentry vehicles and other nuclear armaments. Mullins answered that the words "other nuclear armaments" were used to distinguish bombs and cruise missile warheads from nuclear reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs. Artyukhin indicated he still did not understand the sentence as rendered in the Russian language and asked for a clarification. Look agreed to look into whether the text could be made clearer.

17. (C) Ul'yanov stated that the United States had reduced 543 ODSNW since the last briefing and he believed that this was partially based on the deactivation of 70 Peacekeeper warheads. He asked how the remainder of the U.S. reductions were made. Could the U.S. Delegation provide a breakout of the reductions by ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers?

U.S. QUESTIONS

18. (C) Look referred to the repeated reference to service life for Russian strategic systems in the Russian briefing and asked whether there was a specific end of service life for each type of Russian system. Fedorchenko answered that each system had a specific service life, but the service life could be extended. He believed both the United States and Russia used the service life concept.

19. (C) Siemon asked whether the strategic nuclear warhead number presented in the Russian briefing was calculated using the definition provided by Russia in March 2005. Fedorchenko responded that the Russian definition was described on slide Two of the Russian presentation and the United States would see the definition when the briefing was translated.

20. (C) Smith asked whether Russia had included any heavy bomber weapons in its strategic nuclear warhead total.

Artyukhin responded that Russia only counted heavy bomber weapons located on heavy bomber bases. Since Russian practice did not locate heavy bomber weapons storage locations on heavy bomber bases, no heavy bomber weapons were counted.

¶21. (C) Singer asked whether there were any SLBM warheads attributed to SLBM launchers that did not contain missiles. Fedorchenko answered that, with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs, the Russian aggregate 2,913 number only related to launchers actually containing missiles with warheads on them. He added that the Typhoon SSBN converted for RSM-56 missiles and the Typhoon awaiting elimination did not count because there were no missiles in the launchers.

¶22. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Briefing on Strategic Nuclear Forces, dated October 2005

- Russia:

-- Briefing on Nuclear Strategic Forces, dated October 26, 2005.

¶23. (U) Participants:

U.S.

DAS Look
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Singer
Col Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Mr. Ul'yanov
Mr. Artem'yev
Gen-Maj Artyukhin
Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Kamenskiy
Amb Masterkov
Mr. Mezhenyy
Ms. Sorokina
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)
¶24. (U) Look sends.
Moley